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It is useful to distinguish between exogenous and endogenous factors behind 
contemporary and expected future problems for the welfare state. This paper tries to 
identify major problems of both types and to indicate alternative reform possibilities 
to deal with them. At the same time as several governments struggle with such 
reforms, new demands on the welfare state emerge. Although the basic structure of 
today’s welfare-state arrangements certainly can be kept, the reforms required are 
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PROSPECTS FOR THE WELFARE STATE 
 
 
What are the most severe problems of contemporary welfare-state arrangements in 
Western Europe, and what are the main options for future reforms of these 
arrangements? When discussing these issues, I use the term “welfare state” in a 
narrow sense. I refer to two types of government-controlled expenditure programs, 
namely transfer payment, mainly in the form of social insurance, and subsidies or 
direct government provision of human services such as child care, education, health 
care and old-age care. Although the organization of both types of programs differs 
considerably across West European countries, I will concentrate on issues that are 
common to all these countries.  
 
Both problems and contemporary reform proposals concerning welfare-state 
arrangements should be seen against the background of the achievements of existing 
arrangements. Therefore, let us remind ourselves of the fact that the welfare state has 
brought about both efficiency gains and redistributional achievements. It is useful to 
distinguish between two types of efficiency gains. One is to reduce the income risks 
of individuals, in particular through various social insurance arrangements, mainly in 
connection with unemployment, temporary and permanent disability and retirement. 
Well known deficiencies in voluntary insurance markets, which tend to leave large 
population groups without any insurance, constitute an important background for the 
efficiency gains of mandatory social insurance. The other basic efficiency gain of the 
welfare state is that subsidized provision of various types of human services has 
mitigated tendencies to underinvestment in human capital. An important explanation 
for such underinvestment is the difficulty for the individual to invest in human capital 
because of liquidity constraints, including the inability to borrow with human capital 
as collateral. Another explanation for such underinvestment is that, for obvious 
reasons, the individual does not take into account positive external effects on others of 
such investments.  
 
So much for the efficiency gains. There is also evidence that contemporary welfare-
state arrangements have succeeded in redistributing both income and the provision of   3
human services to low-income groups. This holds, in particular, for yearly income and 
yearly consumption of human services, but at least in some countries, it also seems to 
hold for life-time income and life-time consumption of such services.  
 
Generally speaking, both the efficiency gains and the redistributional achievements of 
the modern welfare state are impressive. Indeed, on various occasions, I have 
characterized the modern welfare state as “a major achievement of modern 
civilization”. However, contemporary and expected future problems for the welfare 
state are also huge, and these problems constitute a natural starting point for a 
discussion of the prospects for the welfare-state, including the possibilities of 
reforming contemporary arrangements without undermining their major 
achievements.  
  
When discussing these issues, it is useful to distinguish between exogenous and 
endogenous factors behind contemporary and expected future problems for the 
welfare state. By “exogenous factors” I mean economic and social forces that have 
mainly emerged independently of the welfare state. Conversely, by the term 
“endogenous factors”, I refer to forces that, in fact, have basically been initiated by 
the welfare state arrangements themselves. Naturally, the borderline between 
exogenous and endogenous factors is far from clear-cut. 
 
Exogenous factors. 
The modern welfare state was built up during a unique historical period, in particular 
during the first three decades after World War II. During this period, a number of 
circumstances were highly favorable for the functioning of the welfare state. My point 
is that these circumstances have subsequently, to a considerable extent, faded away.  
 
The demography was favorable during the first decades after World War II in the 
sense that the share of elderly was rather low. As we know, this is no longer the case, 
and the demography will deteriorate further in the future as a result of low birth rates 
and increased life expectancy. The so-called “dependency ratio” in the EU (the ratio 
of individuals above 65 to those between 15 and 65) has almost doubled since 1950, 
and is almost expected to have doubled again by 2050 according to EU calculations 
(Bovenberg, 2007). The financial situation of benefit-based pay-as-you-go (“paygo”)   4
social insurance systems is particularly harmed by such developments, since revenue 
growth in such systems to a considerable extent depends on the rate of growth of the 
labor force. 
 
 However, as argued by some authors such as Hans-Werner Sinn (2000), the choice of 
families to have fewer children may partly be the result of the build-up of the welfare-
state arrangements themselves, since these have reduced the need for parents to be 
supported by their own children in old age. Hence, the demographic development 
may, in fact, not be entirely exogenous with respect to the welfare-state arrangements. 
But it is an open question how important this particular mechanism is; after all, 
similar demographic developments have taken place in countries without elaborate 
welfare-state arrangements, such as a number of countries in South East Asia.  
 
The low level of unemployment in Western Europe during the first decades after 
World War, typically 2-4 percent, also contributed to the financial viability of the 
welfare-state during that period. However, since the unemployment rate has hovered 
in the interval of 8-10 percent since the early 1980s, the financial position of the 
welfare state has suffered “in both ends”: the costs have increased while the tax base 
has eroded.  
 
Moreover, during the first decades after World War II, real wages were sufficiently 
low to make it fairly easy to tax-finance the provision of labor-intensive services such 
as education and old-age care. This is becoming increasingly difficult because labor 
productivity tends to increase at a much slower rate in these sectors than in most other 
sectors of the national economy. Since wages tend to increase at about the same rate 
in all sectors, the relative costs of labor-intensive services tend to increase gradually 
over time – reflecting Baumol’s celebrated cost disease for labor-intensive human 
services (Baumol 1967). For instance, suppose that the government, and the 
electorate, want to increase the provision of tax-financed labor-intensive human 
services at the same rate as the provision of other goods and services – a rather 
realistic assumption in view of earlier experiences. It is easy to show algebraically 
that the tax rates must then be raised, without limit, at a rate determined by the 
difference between labor productivity growth for tax-financed services and other 
products (Lindbeck 2006, Appendix).    5
 
Baumol’s cost disease is particularly relevant for services such as child care, 
education and old-age care. The situation is somewhat different for health care, since 
the rate of productivity growth is, in fact, quite fast for certain tasks in this sector 
because of new operation techniques and new medicines. However, as we know, 
productivity growth in health care also takes the form of increased possibilities to treat 
health problems that could not be effectively dealt with earlier. As a result, requests 
by individuals to be treated for health problems tend to increase over time without any 
apparent limit. Thus, the financing of sick-care tends to run into similar difficulties as 
child care, education and old-age care – although largely for different reasons. 
 
Finally, the modern welfare state has traditionally been a “national project”. The 
modest level of international economic interdependence during the first decades after 
World War II meant that the international complications as concerns welfare-state 
arrangements were modest. As noted by many observers, the subsequent economic 
internationalization process has changed the situation for the welfare state. One 
example is that increased international competition may affect the distribution of 
factor income within individual countries in ways that conflict with national 
distributional ambitions. At the same time, the national autonomy of redistribution 
policy tends to fall when domestic tax bases become more internationally mobile. For 
instance, although taxes on capital income are not very important for financing 
welfare-state arrangements, the increased international mobility of capital has 
certainly made it more difficult to redistribute income among citizens through capital 
taxation. In the future, the internationalization process may also reduce the 
possibilities of using progressive taxes on labor income as a tool for redistribution 
policy. 
 
In the general policy discussion, there is today a strong tendency to blame 
contemporary and expected future welfare-state problems on the internationalization 
(globalization) process. It is, however, quite clear that the major problems for the 
welfare state, so far, are related to domestic forces, including those discussed above. It 
is certainly possible to moderate some of these forces. For instance, in a long-term 
perspective, contemporary demographic trends may be mitigated by more friendly 
policies towards families raising children, for instance by income transfers to such   6
families and subsidies of child care. Moreover, in view of gradually better health 
among the elderly, it is natural to raise the statutory pension age and reduce the degree 
of subsidization of early retirement.  
 
In principle, immigration of relatively young individuals would also mitigate the 
demographic problems, although such immigration would have to be quite huge to 
make a considerable contribution in this respect.
1 However, to successfully integrate 
immigrants in the labor market, it is also important to reduce the present insider-
outsider nature of the West European labor market. One way of doing so would be to 
opt for more flexibility of relative wages, another to reduce the relative market powers 
of labor-market insiders by softening the strict job security legislation that exists in 
some countries. Large-scale immigration of low-skilled workers is difficult to 
reconcile with the present minimum wages in Western Europe (brought about through 
government regulations or union bargaining.)  
 
Similar labor-market reforms are important for keeping down the general 
unemployment level of domestic outsiders, such as new entrants and elderly. 
Naturally, such reforms are politically difficult to implement since, at a given point in 
time, insiders constitute a majority of the labor force. 
 
To avoid gradually rising tax rates in connection with the financing of such services, 
governments seem to have (at least) three options. One is to stimulate productivity 
growth in these sectors, for instance by better training, incentives for cost-saving 
innovation and more competition from private agents; it is, however, an open question 
how successful such attempts could be. A second option is to shift to new methods for 
financing human services, for instance mandatory insurance fees or user fees when 
individuals use the services. An obvious problem with both methods is that they easily 
come into conflict with distributional ambitions. However, if both alternatives are 
rejected, the remaining option for avoiding gradually rising tax rates would be to 
altogether stop the expansion of tax-financed consumption of human services, which 
                                                 
1 Solving the demographic problem in Europe only by immigration would, based on calculations by the 
UN, require an immigration to Europe of about 700 million – assuming unchanged trends in other 
respects (Sinn, 2007).   7
would mean that the private sector would increasingly take over the financing of 
services in this field. 
 
Endogenous factors 
So much for exogenous factors behind contemporary welfare-state problems. 
Endogenous factors consist of “undesired” behavior adjustments by individuals as a 
result of the welfare-state arrangements. Such adjustments take place as combined 
effects of explicit tax wedges and so-called “moral hazard” in the context of various 
social insurance arrangements, i.e., tendencies among individuals to “overexploit” the 
benefit systems – as compared to what these systems were supposed to be used for. 
 
Starting the discussion with explicit tax wedges, it is important to notice that these do 
not only make leisure more attractive as compared to work. Individuals may also be 
induced to shift from work in the open (regular) labor market to household production 
and black-market work. The returns to saving and education are also reduced, in 
particular if income taxes are progressive. Naturally, there are methods for mitigating 
such effects. One is to reduce the effective tax wedge, another to counteract some of 
the effects of the tax wedges on the allocation of resources.  
 
The most obvious method for reducing the effective tax wedge is to strengthen the link 
between social insurance contributions and expected future social insurance benefits. 
For instance, the effective tax wedge in the pension system may be reduced by a shift 
to a more actuarial pension system. This may also be achieved in the context of paygo 
financing (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003). In fact, the tax wedge then becomes equal to 
the difference between the statutory tax rate and the (capital value) of the benefit rate.
2 
A basic dilemma of such a reform is, of course, that the possibilities to use welfare-
state arrangements as instruments of redistribution policy would then fall. Other types 
of tax reforms that reduce the tax wedge may not run into such problems. One 
example is to shift the tax base of income taxes from family income to the income of 
individual family members. In countries with progressive taxes, such reforms do not 
                                                 
2 Denote the wage rate by w, the tax rate (pension contribution rate) by t, the replacement rate of the 
pension system (the benefit as a fraction of previous earnings) by b and the real discount factor 
(connecting the period of work and the period of retirement) by D. The net earnings of the individual 
when working are w(1-t), while they are wb when retired, with the capital value Dwb during the period 
of work. Hence, the return to work is  (1 ) wtD w b −+ =  [ ] 1( ) wt D b −− .    8
only stimulate labor force participation by married females, they also contribute to 
increase the economic independence of married females.  
 
There are also important examples of policy measures that counteract the effects of 
tax wedges on individual behavior. One example is increased subsidies of education 
to mitigate the tax disincentives on investment in human capital (in particular, in the 
case of progressive taxes). Another example is subsidies on the purchase of services 
that are close substitutes to household production – obvious examples being child 
care, cleaning, home repairs and gardening (Lindbeck, 1982). Such subsidies also tend 
to shift back the production of such services from the underground economy to the 
regular economy. However, one problem with such subsidies is to decide which 
services to include in the subsidy programs. For instance, should visits to restaurants 
be included? After all, such visits are also rather close substitutes to home production 
of meals. 
 
So much for explicit tax wedges. Moral hazard is often a more serious problem. 
While tax wedges usually result in marginal behavior adjustments (adjustments on the 
“intensive margin”), such as fewer hours of work, moral hazard often takes the form 
of a complete withdrawal from the labor market at least for a period of time 
(adjustment on the extensive margin). The latter type of behavior adjustment seems to 
be particularly usual in the case of unemployment insurance, sick-pay insurance, 
disability pensions and benefits for parents to stay home to take care of sick children. 
The incentives for such behavior adjustments, including explicit insurance fraud, 
emerge as a combined effect of the tax wedges and generous benefit rules. Indeed, the 
effective tax wedge on work in the case of social insurance is the sum of the tax rate 
and the benefit rate.
3  
 
Hence, moral hazard accentuates tax distortions on the allocation of resources – or the 
other way round. For instance, suppose that your marginal tax rate on labor earnings 
                                                 
3 Using the same notation as in the previous footnote, the net earnings of the individual when working 
are  (1 ) wt −  if working and wbif living on benefits (where b is now the benefit rate). Hence, the 
difference in net income when working and living on benefits is  [ ] (1 ) 1 ( ) wt b w w t b −− = −+  with 
the tax wedge () tb + . 
In countries where benefits are taxed, the relevant benefit rate is, of course, the net-of-tax rate.   9
is 40 percent and that you get a benefit amounting to 50 percent of your previous 
wage rate when living on (untaxed) social insurance benefits. This means that your 
total implicit tax wedge is 90 percent (40 plus 50) when choosing between work and 
living on benefits. In this sense, the individual’s return on work is only 10 percent of 
the wage earnings (as compared to living on benefits). This is an important 
background to the fact that about 20 percent of the individuals of working age in 
Western Europe today live on government benefits. 
 
Naturally, moral hazard is not only influenced by economic incentives but also by 
prevailing social norms in society concerning the utilization of benefit systems. 
Before the build-up of the modern welfare state, it was natural that social norms 
emerged according to which able-bodied individuals were supposed to support 
themselves, usually by work. Then came the welfare state, which contributed to 
separate income from work to a considerable extent, in particular for low-income 
groups. To begin with, the effects on labor supply seem to have been quite small. One 
possible reason is that social norms inherited from the past mitigated potential 
disincentives on work. In a number of papers, I have hypothesized that after a while, 
some “entrepreneurial” individual found out that it was possible to survive, and even 
to consume nearly as much as before without working, at least for a period of time. 
And when some individuals started to exploit the benefit systems, we may 
hypothesize that others followed suit, since it became less stigmatizing to exploit the 
systems when others also did so. Thus, I hypothesize that “norm drift” has in fact 
taken place in recent decades (Lindbeck, 1995; Lindbeck, Nyberg, Weibull, 1999; 
Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006). A complementary hypothesis is that the speed of the 
norm drift was boosted by a number of negative macroeconomic shocks, which 
“threw” some individuals onto various safety nets. 
  
The fact that individuals change their behavior as a result of being insured is not 
necessarily a “problem”. After all, an idea of income insurance is to make it 
financially feasible for the individual to stay home when work is connected with 
particularly serious discomfort – and, in the case of unemployment benefits, devote a 
reasonable amount of time to job search. The problem is that some countries have 
tilted the trade off between income protection and work incentives so strongly in favor 
of the former that the induced change in behavior has been much larger than intended   10
by the authorities, in the sense that people today make more ”generous” 
interpretations of their rights to live on social insurance benefits than what has been 
intended by the insurance authorities.  
 
This hypothesis is consistent with Swedish experiences. For instance, a number of 
attitude studies in Sweden conclude that a majority of the population consider that it is 
OK to live on sickness benefits also without being sick, for instance because they do 
not like their job, they dislike their boss or experience conflicts in their own family 
(see, for instance, Modig and Broberg, 2002). Other studies indicate that the actual 
behavior of many individuals is based on very generous interpretations of the right to 
receive social insurance benefits. For instance, Skogman Thoursie (2004) found that 
sickness absence increased by 16 percent among men as compared to women in 
connection with TV emissions of the World Championship in cross-country skiing in 
1987, and by 6.6 percent in connection with the Winter Olympics in 1988. More 
strikingly, Persson (2005) found that sickness absence among men increased by 41 
percent as compared to women in connection with the 2002 World Championship in 
football. There are also huge geographical variations in paid sickness absence, which 
cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors, but which are consistent with the 
hypothesis of variations in local social norms (Lindbeck, Palme and Persson, 2007).
4 
Today, there is also considerable accumulated evidence of explicit benefit fraud in 
Sweden indicating, for instance, that individuals receiving unemployment benefits or 
sick-pay actually work at the same time (often in the black labor market). Another 
example is that individuals receiving benefits for the purpose of taking care of sick 
children in fact have taken their children to day-care institutions, and in some cases 
have even gone to work themselves (Delegationen mot felaktiga utbetalningar, 2007). 
However, we do not have any comparable data from the past to confirm whether 
attitudes and behavior in these respects have actually changed over time. This means 
that the “norm drift” hypothesis is still just a hypothesis – although, in my view, a 
reasonable one. 
  
In principle, four methods seem to be available to mitigate problems of moral hazard 
in connection with welfare-state arrangements: (i) stronger work incentives through 
                                                 
4 This study uses various proxies and instrument variables to find evidence of the role of local social 
norms for explaining local variations in sickness absence in Sweden.    11
less generous benefits and lower tax rates; (ii) stricter controls, (iii) attempts to 
directly influence social norms; and (iv) a shift from subsidies of non-work (as in the 
case of traditional social insurance benefits) to subsidies of work. Since each method 
is connected with specific problems, presumably with rising disadvantages when the 
use of one method is increased, it makes sense for governments to combine all 
methods simultaneously. Indeed, a combination of all these measures in Sweden in 
recent years seems to have contributed to a considerable reduction in sickness absence 
– in spite of a cyclical economic upswing, which usually triggers higher absence rates. 
 
The fourth method (subsidies of working) may very well turn out to be the most 
promising one. Depending exactly on the purpose of such subsidies, these may take 
somewhat different forms. In countries where the wages of low-productivity workers 
are particularly low, the most relevant intervention may be wage supplements paid 
directly to the individual (such as “tax credits”) – for the purpose of stimulating low-
productivity workers to look for jobs as well as reducing the incidence of “working 
poor”. Indeed, the United State and the United Kingdom have opted for such 
programs – although, so far, for rather limited groups of low-productivity individuals. 
In contrast, in countries where the wages for low-productivity workers are relatively 
high (because of legal minimum wages or union wage bargaining), it may be more 
relevant to subsidize the wage costs of firms for the purpose of stimulating these to 
increase their demand for such workers. Although the (general equilibrium) effects of 
these two types of interventions may converge in the long run, the short- and medium-
run effects will differ because of rigidities in wage formation for low-skilled workers. 
 
In the case of both types of interventions, we may talk about a shift of emphasis from 
“welfare” to “workfare”. In my own country, Sweden, subsidies of work have recently 
been used both to stimulate low-skilled workers to look for jobs and to stimulate firms 
to increase their demand for such workers.  
 
New demands on the welfare state 
At the same time as several governments today struggle with reforms and retreats of 
welfare state arrangements – often along the lines mentioned above – new demands 
on the welfare state tend to emerge. For instance, increased labor force participation 
of females tends to increase the demand for subsidized child care and old-age care – at   12
the same time as such arrangements in themselves tend to stimulate female labor force 
participation (reverse causation). In this field, the Nordic countries, and to some 
extent France, have been forerunners. Moreover, less stability of families makes a 
case for the sharing (splitting) of accumulated social entitlements (such as pension 
benefits) between spouses in the case of divorce, in the same way as such sharing 
usually takes place for other types of assets accumulated by family members.  
 
Moreover, increased individualism in terms of values and attitudes – reported in 
various attitude studies – means that individuals are likely to ask for more freedom of 
choice concerning income insurance and providers of human services. In the case of 
income insurance, one way of accommodating such demand is to allow people to opt 
out from mandatory insurance systems (such as in the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands). In the case of human services, tax-financed voucher systems (in the 
sense that the tax money follows the individual’s choice of service provider) are an 
obvious method for increasing the freedom of choice. In this way, competition in the 
production of human services will also increase, which will most likely contribute to 
higher productivity and more innovation. However, it is then important to build up 
government inspection systems to mitigate the risk that private providers shirk on 
quality when trying to cut costs. Another example of new demands on the welfare 
state is that the internationalization of the labor market raises the demands for more 
cross country portability of welfare-state entitlements.  
  
There is also an emerging view among observers that variations in health conditions 
across developed countries today depend more on differences in life style than on 
differences in the availability of sick care. A natural adjustment to this observation is, 
of course, an increased emphasis on preventive as compared to curative health care, in 
particular through policies encouraging a healthy life style. It is a moot question how 
much the government should intervene in individuals’ life style for this purpose. 
 
Moreover, new types of social problems in urban areas require new and more 
selective social policies – important examples being drug problems, criminality, 
vandalism and an agglomeration of mentally disturbed individuals in cities. Since 
voluntary private organizations in many cases seem to deal better with some of these   13
problems than government organizations, new partnerships between public and 
private organizations may be useful to deal with these issues.  
 
Political complications 
Not only contemporary and expected future welfare-state problems but also new 
social demand makes a strong case for reforms of welfare-state arrangements in West 
European countries. It is likely that many of these problems can be dealt with by a 
number of partial reforms. A main purpose of such reforms would be to make the 
welfare state more compatible with basic economic incentives, another to better adapt 
welfare-state arrangements to new socio-economic developments. It is certainly not 
necessary to scrap, or even drastically overhaul the basic structure of contemporary 
welfare-state arrangements in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the reforms required to 
make the welfare state viable, and better adapted to citizens’ demands, are sufficiently 
large to induce various interest groups to resist even partial reforms. The ensuing 
political conflict may therefore, to some extent, counteract the welfare state’s 
contribution to social and political stability. The most “respectable” resistance to 
reforms might come from individuals who are actually not able to work. Elderly who 
have definitely left the labor market, or plan to do so, may also be dissatisfied with 
welfare-state reforms that shift the emphasis from assistance to the elderly to 
assistance to families with small children, or to citizens of working age with particular 
difficulties in getting jobs (labor-market outsiders). From these points of view, 
generation conflicts are likely to be accentuated. 
 
One important aspect of future welfare-state policies is whether politicians should 
continue to rely on discretionary, ad hoc reforms or if they should instead try to create 
“built-in” automatic adjustment mechanisms in various benefit systems. By the latter, 
I refer to administratively rather than politically managed adjustments of various 
benefit systems in response, for instance, to changes in demography, real wage growth 
and employment growth. An advantage of relying more on automatic adjustment 
mechanisms is that the “burden” on politicians to take unpopular decisions in concrete 
cases would then fall. Indeed, shifts to such automatic adjustment mechanisms have 
already been taken in some countries. For instance, in some countries, including 
Sweden, the pension benefits will in the future be determined by automatic downward 
adjustments of the pension benefits if the number of pensioners increases as a result of   14
increased life expectancy, or if the rate of growth of real wages for contemporary 
workers falls. Naturally, even if the social insurance systems become more financially 
stable as a result of such automatic adjustment mechanisms, it remains an open 
question whether automatic adjustment rules themselves will be politically stable. 
 
Regardless of whether the reforms consist of ad hoc interventions or automatic 
adjustment mechanisms, there is a case for early rather than late reforms. If the 
reforms are much delayed, they may have to be quite drastic, in particular if social 
norms against “over-using” various benefit systems have already been considerably 
weakened. It is, however, well known that it is often difficult for politicians to act 
early – in particular before a majority of the population has realized that reforms 
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